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## PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS

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### NATURE AND SCOPE OF PRESENT POLITICAL THEORY

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One of the fundamental differences that distinguish human beings from the lower forms of life is their respective relations to their environments. All living creatures except man are at the mercy of their surroundings. They live under conditions which are not of their making and which are but little changed by their efforts. No conscious purpose nor definite idea of progress is possible among them. They live in a world of nature and are constantly limited by its conditions, being unable to control it or to change their own destiny by their own deliberate actions.

The relation of man to his environment is essentially different.<sup>1</sup> While, in primitive times, man, like the lower creatures, lived at the mercy of nature and developed in accordance with the laws of natural evolution, a point was reached later when human reason began to modify its environment. Natural phenomena were investigated and understood and conscious direction and purpose gradually replaced the earlier and purely physical relation between man and nature. This was the case, not only with the physical environment, composed of those geographic and climatic conditions and their resultant natural resources, within which all life exists, but also of the social environment, composed of those ideas, associations and institutions that make up the non-physical life of man. In the same way that man began to investigate nature, learn her laws, bring her powers under his control, and utilize her resources, so man began to question the psychical and social conditions that surrounded him, to examine their nature, to question their authority, and finally to plan deliberate change and progress. All early social institutions, therefore, arose and for a time developed unconsciously. Only gradually did man realize their existence and the possibility of directing or improving them by his own purposeful efforts.

<sup>1</sup> Kelly, *Government or Human Evolution: Justice*, bk. II.

Of all these social institutions the *state* has been one of the most universal and most powerful. Some form of organization and authority has been found wherever human life has existed, and a sanction of some kind has enforced some sort of rules. In the process of human development it was, therefore, inevitable that man should investigate this institution, should attempt to discover its origin, should question or uphold its authority, and should dispute over the proper scope of its functions. As the outcome of this process arose political theory. The associated life of man, arising spontaneously and growing at first without conscious direction, came later under the scrutiny of man's reason; and attempts were made, crude enough in the beginning, to explain the nature of political phenomena. Increasing powers of observation and of logical analysis built up a constantly widening sphere of political speculation, and the development of the state in its objective phase of organization and activity was, accordingly, accompanied by its subjective phase—the theory of the state—in the minds of men.

It is evident that, at any given time, a close relation must exist between the political theory of that period and the actual political conditions then existing.<sup>2</sup> Occasionally, philosophers may speculate concerning the ideal state or may draw pictures of political conditions as, in their own opinions, they should be. Even this type of political theory, however, will, if closely examined, prove to be based on the political ideals of its time, and will usually be aimed at certain specific evils to which the conditions then prevailing gave rise. Ordinarily, political theories are the direct result of objective political conditions. They reflect the thoughts and interpret the motives that underlie actual political development. They indicate the spirit and conditions of their age. On the other hand, political theories also influence political development. They are not only the outgrowth of actual conditions but they, in turn, lead men to modify their political institutions. Political theories are thus both cause and effect. Changing conditions create new theories; these in turn influence actual political methods.

It therefore follows that much of the political theory of any given time is not put into definite or comprehensive statement. It is found tacitly underlying the form of actual political organization and methods. Where there is one philosopher who is occupied in an impartial attempt to build up a complete system of political theory, there are hundreds of politicians who are interested in a more or less selfish or one-sided polit-

<sup>2</sup> Willoughby, *Political Theories of the Ancient World*, Preface.

ical principle which they desire to see incorporated into political practice. Questions of policy almost always require a broad theoretical basis for rejection or approval. Accordingly, political theory must be sought, not only in the writings of those who deliberately attempt to formulate a systematic statement of its principles, but even more in the fugitive and ephemeral opinions of those engaged in actual politics and in the public opinion to which they appeal.<sup>3</sup> The political theory of the United States illustrates this fact. Americans have seldom been interested in systematic politics; our governmental organization and policy have, in fact, been characterized by frequent inconsistencies. Yet our whole national history has centered around certain political theories which have been powerful enough to cause men to sacrifice for them their lives, and which have now become a part of our national habit of thought.<sup>4</sup> American patriotism, indeed, is a feeling of reverence, not so much for the soil or for the citizen as for certain political ideals, many of which have commonly been accepted as absolute; some at least becoming obstructive to needed change.

At the present time political theory is of particular interest and importance.<sup>5</sup> The modern state is finding itself, is settling upon its first principles, is directing its growth, and deciding upon the proper nature and extent of its activities. The tendencies of the times point toward an expansion of state function that has enormous possibilities for good or evil. In the complex civilization of the present day the relations of state to state and of state to individual demand constant adjustment and readjustment; and this process should rest upon definite and clearly realized principles as to the nature and purpose of political institutions. A knowledge of the origin and development of political organizations and ideas is essential to any successful attempt at explaining or appreciating those of the present, and a realization of the proper purpose and limits of state action would both hasten real progress and prevent extreme and radical attempts at the impossible.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, a fundamental change of mental attitude is now revolutionizing political theory. The former attitude was deductive, based on certain axioms as to the traditional nature of political institutions and authority. From these premises conclusions were reached by logic

<sup>3</sup> Hart, *Actual Government*, p. xxxiv.

<sup>4</sup> Merriam, *American Political Theories*.

<sup>5</sup> Beard, "Politics," Lecture delivered at Columbia University, February, 1908.

<sup>6</sup> Willoughby, "The Value of Political Philosophy" in *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1907.

as to what should be, and political conditions were judged, not in accordance with actual circumstances, but in accordance with prevailing ideals based upon the fundamental assumptions. At present political theory is inductive. As Professor Ford says:

Political phenomena are observed and classified, and generalizations are made from data thus collected. . . . Instead of considering first what ought to be, the aim is to consider first what is. As a result, treatises on government are appearing that are not doctrinal in character, like our older manuals on civics and politics, but are descriptive and expository, telling simply and plainly how the public authority under consideration is organized, how it works and with what results. They are studies of political structure and function, conceived in the same scientific spirit as that of a zoölogist examining the fauna of a particular region.<sup>7</sup>

It remains to add that political theory is essentially relative in its nature. In the past it grew out of actual conditions and of existing methods of thought; at present it represents our understanding of the political world in which we live and the political ideals in which we believe. No theory of the state can be considered as ultimate truth. A century hence, under the changed conditions of that time, our present attitude toward political problems may seem as crude and absurd as many of the theories that have arisen in the past now seem to us. This does not, however, diminish the necessity that each age should build up for itself a philosophy of the state, based upon its development up to the point then reached, upon the actual conditions then existing, and upon the ideals of the future then held.

An analysis of present political theory shows it to be made up of three fairly distinct, yet closely interrelated elements. These may be outlined as follows:

#### 1. HISTORICAL POLITICAL THEORY

This deals with the past and consists of a body of literature including both the ideal speculations and the descriptive accounts of past political theorists.<sup>8</sup> In addition to the writings of publicists, historical political theory includes the principles upon which past political institutions were actually based, many of these principles, unrecognized in their own times, having been deduced as a result of modern historical knowledge

<sup>7</sup> Ford, "The Cause of Political Corruption," in *Scribner's Magazine*. January 1911.

<sup>8</sup> Dunning, *Political Theories*.

of past politics. Historical political theory aims to explain the origin and development of the state, the conditions that led to its appearance, and the laws of its growth. In the uncritical past, when historical knowledge was slight and when historical proportion and perspective were absent, numerous attempts were made to account for the beginnings of political institutions and for the nature of political authority. While containing important elements of truth, each of these theories was incomplete and one-sided, often because it was developed to uphold some preconceived purpose, to support or to attack such authority as then was found. Under these circumstances the real facts concerning the origin and growth of the state were unknown or disregarded. Among these theories the most important were the divine theory, which considered the state as established and directed by the authority of God; the force theory, which considered the origin of the state to be the forced subjection of the weak to the strong; and the social contract theory, which viewed the state as the deliberate creation of individuals by means of a voluntary agreement.<sup>9</sup> Such theories of state evolution as were found depended upon the conditions prevailing at any given time, with little effort to relate them to past development or to the general principles of political growth. Indeed, the same theory might, by a slight shifting of emphasis, be made to explain widely different phases in state evolution. Thus the social contract theory, in the hands of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, served in turn as the support of absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and democracy. Similarly, the theory of feudalism, and the doctrines of church and state were adapted, as needed, to the political development of the Middle Ages.<sup>10</sup>

Only recently have the expansion of historical knowledge, the rise of a critical historical attitude, and the acceptance of the theory of evolution made possible anything like a satisfactory or logical theory as to the origin and development of the state. Even yet our knowledge of the early period of political life is incomplete, and several points concerning its rise and growth are in dispute. In general, however, the modern historical or evolutionary theory views the state neither as divinely created nor as the deliberate work of man through either conquest or agreement. It sees the state like other social institutions, coming into existence unconsciously, at various times and in different ways, as the result of a process of natural evolution.<sup>11</sup> The life of men in association,

<sup>9</sup> Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*. pp. 18-88.

<sup>10</sup> Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*.

<sup>11</sup> Deale, *The Development of the State*, chs. i. ii.

their bonds of kinship and religion, the need for regulation in securing order and protection, coöperation for defense or aggression—these created organization and authority, the crude beginnings of the state. By gradual evolution, under changing conditions and by a process by no means uniform, political life became more definite and more universal. Men learned first to obey, then to govern themselves. Unconscious development gave way to conscious progress, and state growth, influenced by external conditions, by changes in other institutions, and by the efforts of individuals, formed part of the great world movement of nature and man.<sup>12</sup>

## 2. ANALYTICAL OR DESCRIPTIVE POLITICAL THEORY

This deals with the present, and consists of philosophical concepts and principles concerning the nature of the state, its essential attributes, and the meaning and justification of its authority. Questions concerning the nature of government, sovereignty, liberty, and law, the relation of state to state, and of state to individual, must be considered, and a satisfactory theory evolved to comprehend the modern state in all its forms and relations.

On essential points as to their nature and organization all advanced modern states are in substantial agreement. Modern theory views the state as the outward organized manifestation of a conscious spirit of political unity. Geographic causes, common interests, the feeling of nationality, and political expediency are among the causes that create this unity, or general will, as it may be called; and when it is outwardly realized in the creation of government, a state exists. All states consist of populations, inhabiting definite territories, organized by means of governments which express and administer law,—the sovereign will of the state. All are legal persons which adjust the mutual rights and obligations of their citizens and which determine their relations with other states. In a theoretical, or purely legal sense, all are internally supreme and externally independent and equal.<sup>13</sup> In actual operation, the supremacy of internal sovereignty is, of course, limited by the complex interests and motives that influence the creation and application of law, and that determine political policy and methods. In international relations, the theory of legal equality is nullified by actual differ-

<sup>12</sup> Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, ch. vi.

<sup>13</sup> Crane, "The State in Constitutional and International Law," Johns Hopkins University Studies, series xxv, nos. 6, 7.

ences in size, strength, and wealth; and the theory of independence is modified by treaty agreements, by anomalous political situations, such as neutralized states, protectorates, and spheres of influence, and by practical political dogmas such as the balance of power and the Monroe Doctrine.<sup>14</sup>

Certain questions in modern political theory, for example, the proper adjustment of authority and liberty within the state, and the relations of states with one another, are still in dispute and will probably never be decided satisfactorily to all, since by their very nature they demand compromises and must constantly be adapted to changing conditions. For several reasons satisfactory agreement concerning all points of analytical political theory is difficult. In the first place, it is obvious that descriptive political theory dealing with the nature of the state at any given time becomes shortly historical political theory, as time passes and conditions change. It is always difficult to abandon old theories and create new ones in accord with actual facts. Indeed, it is often difficult to realize that conditions have changed and to see clearly political institutions and methods as they are. Hence the theories of the past linger and die hard; legal fictions remain after the circumstances that created them have passed away. The theory of the power of the crown in England long outlived the actual supremacy of parliament and the establishment of the cabinet; in theory, the President of the United States is still chosen by the electoral college. The state is always changing and the theory that explains it contains naturally certain survivals of theories that are outgrown but not yet abandoned. A definite line of separation between historical political theory, dealing with the state in the past, and analytical political theory, dealing with the state in the present, cannot be drawn.

Besides, observers of political life are always in danger of depending too largely on written constitutions and laws, on the skeleton of political organization, thereby neglecting the actual working of political institutions, the administration of the laws, and the influences behind the obvious governmental machinery. Hence, again, political theory as to the nature of the state is likely to be composed largely of generalizations as to what the state appears to be, or is intended to be, or ought to be, rather than with what it really is. Many reformers have been surprised and disappointed to find that some pet scheme, which was expected to work in a certain way, actually operated in quite a different way when fitted

<sup>14</sup> Jellinek, *Das Recht des modernen Staates*, pp. 461-470.



with the general system of modern political life. What President Lowell calls the "physiology of politics,"<sup>15</sup> the actual operation of governmental institutions, needs careful consideration; and it is often difficult to discover and to comprehend.

Yet every state must have its political theory. Some general principles will guide the statesman and the citizen; every readjustment of governmental organization and every policy of governmental administration will be based on some general scheme, more or less definite, and more or less comprehensive. It is therefore a service of value to attempt any systematic statement of modern political theory, basing it upon the consensus of opinion among those best informed, and making every effort to fuse it into a harmonious unity that shall include every phase of state existence. On such a basis alone can constructive and far-sighted plans of reform be erected.

### 3. APPLIED POLITICAL THEORY

This deals with the immediate present and the future, and consists of principles and ideals concerning the proper purpose and functions of the state. It views the state, not from the standpoint of what it is, but of what it does. It observes the state in motion instead of at rest; it considers, not organization, but function.<sup>16</sup> It traces present conditions and tendencies and it points out the direction and methods of possible reform and progress. Such questions as the proper ends of the state, the functions that are essential to its existence and those that are optional, with their relative advantages, fall within its scope. Theories ranging all the way from anarchism to socialism show the wide divergence of opinion within this field.<sup>17</sup> Whether the state or the individual is the more important, to be first considered if the interests of both fail to harmonize; whether the functions of the state should be narrowed to the least possible interference with individual freedom, or whether the state should assume a paternal control over a wide sphere of activity, are problems that must be dealt with, if they cannot be solved.

Here again it is evident that the relation is very close between the theory of state function and the theories of state evolution and of state organization. Historical political theory furnishes examples of state

<sup>15</sup> Lowell, "The Physiology of Politics" in *American Political Science Review* vol. iv, no. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Laboulaye, *The Modern State*, ch. i.

<sup>17</sup> Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, ch. ix.

activity in the past and teaches valuable lessons as to probabilities in the future. Analytical political theory, which deals with the organs, cannot be divorced from applied political theory, which deals with their functions. What the state is and what the state does are two aspects of the same question; neither can be explained without the other. Those who believed that the state was of divine origin naturally tended to emphasize its importance and the authority of its rulers at the expense of individual liberty. Those who believed that the state resulted from unjust aggression were equally desirous to limit its authority or even to revolutionize its organization. The prevailing theory of the origin and nature of the state must profoundly influence the prevailing theory of its purpose and proper functions.

Above all, it should be remembered that in this phase, even more than in the others, political theory is relative, changing to meet new needs and to satisfy new ideals. The century that glorifies the state may be followed by one that emphasizes the individual. Functions best performed today by private initiative may demand government regulation or operation tomorrow. The theory of modern states takes, in the main, a middle position.<sup>18</sup> It aims at such division of labor as shall secure the best interests of mankind and of the individual man. It realizes that the state is by no means an evil, and that many things are most satisfactorily dealt with by collective authority. At the same time it recognizes the value of individual initiative and competition, and leaves to each citizen a considerable sphere of free action. Without laying down general rules, it deals with problems as they arise, viewing them in the light of existing conditions and aiming to adjust with most satisfactory general results the interests of the individual and of society.

All questions concerning the proper end or purpose of the state<sup>19</sup> must center around the fundamental relations that underlie all political science—those of state to individual and of state to state, in other words, the internal and external phases of state existence and activity. There are, therefore, three units to be noted: the individual, the state, and the collection of states that comprise the world as a whole. The welfare of each of these units must be considered and their interests may not always be the same. The authority to determine the relative importance of these interests lies, not in the individual nor in the combination of states, but in each state separately. This authority is, of course, largely influenced by the demands of the individuals included in the state and by the pressure of international interests and relations.

<sup>18</sup> Leroy Beaulieu, *The Modern State*, ch. v.

<sup>19</sup> Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State*, bk. v.

In general, states have, up to the present time, subordinated the welfare of the world at large to that of their citizens and to the needs of their own existence. National rivalries have been stronger than international unity. Within the state there has been considerable difference of opinion as to the relative importance of the individual and of the state, sometimes resulting in a paternal despotism or a socialistic commune, when the welfare of the state has been emphasized; sometimes resulting in an unregulated individualism, when the individual man, rather than the social group, has been given first place. Obviously, in the majority of cases the welfare of individual, state, and civilization in general are closely interrelated. What promotes the interests of the average man will ordinarily be for the advantage of his state, and of the community of states. However, this is not always the case, and the relative weight given to these various interests determines largely the attitude and the policy of each state as to its proper sphere of action.

Before the state, in the proper political sense of the term, could be said to exist, the relation of individuals, one to another, and of all to the common authority, had to be determined. This, then, was the primary purpose of the state, and it still remains its chief function. The adjustment of sovereignty to liberty, the maintenance of order and security, the establishment of a government and of a sphere of individual freedom—these first demanded attention, and their chief object was to reconcile the conflicting interests of individuals, to make possible a peaceful and organized social existence, and to secure safety from external danger. Such a process was, indeed, one of the first steps out of barbarism, and it was in the beginning unconscious and undirected.

To accomplish this purpose, chief emphasis was laid on authority and obedience.<sup>20</sup> The sanction of custom and religion was added to physical force and to such public opinion as then existed. Primitive man had first to acquire discipline and subordination; the whole power of the state was exercised by the government and individual freedom was impossible, because unsafe. Hence, the theory naturally arose that considered the state to be an end in itself. No part of the life of the individual was free from its interference or authority; every detail of his conduct was minutely regulated and no conception of individual interests, as distinct from general interests, was possible. Such was the theory of the state that prevailed among the ancient Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans; and, to a greater or less degree, it has accompanied the rise of political life wherever found.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, pp. 25-30.

<sup>21</sup> Esmein, *Droit Constitutionnel*, p. 377.

This condition, however, if permanent, leads to stagnation. After its end has been accomplished, that is, after the disposition to obey law and to observe order has been established, it must be modified before further progress can take place. A certain sphere of free action must then be allowed to the individual. The state must mark out a field, narrow at first, but widening as political intelligence and interest grows, within which it guarantees the individual against interference at the hands, not only of other individuals, but also of the government. Within this field individuals or non-political associations of individuals are to be unmolested, though they may be aided, by the state.

The creation, then, of the respective spheres of authority and liberty, their adjustment from time to time as conditions change, the organization of government to create and administer the will of the state within the field of authority, the determination of the political privileges and the civil rights of its citizens—these form the primary ends of the state and must be accomplished in order that there may be a state, in order that men may live peaceful and orderly and safe lives in organized association.<sup>22</sup>

When this primary purpose of the state is in a fair way toward realization, a secondary end becomes important. During the process of establishing government and liberty, of maintaining order and justice, the state becomes conscious of its own existence. It realizes its own unity and sets to work to perpetuate and strengthen its own life. This necessitates certain activities both within the state and without. The state must perfect its internal unity and must safeguard its external independence. To this end efforts will be made to secure definite and natural territorial frontiers, to surround the state on all sides with natural barriers—mountains or the sea—and to strengthen its exposed sides by fortifications and garrisons, or by treaty agreements with its neighbors. Efforts will also be made to perfect the ethnic homogeneity of its people. Regulations will be set up against promiscuous immigration and efforts will be made to secure uniformity of race, language and religion, to develop a feeling of national solidarity. Other states will be watched with a jealous eye lest they grow too wealthy or too powerful. Tariff barriers will be established and Balance of Power theories arise.

The secondary aim of the state becomes, therefore, by this process, the perfection of its own national life.<sup>23</sup> Instead of acting only as an arbiter to maintain peace and security, the state takes an active part in

<sup>22</sup> Burgess, *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, vol. i, pp. 86-87.

<sup>23</sup> Hill, *World Organization and the Modern State*, pp. 56-76.

promoting the common welfare. No rights of the individual are allowed to stand in the way of this purpose. The needs of the state may demand the sacrifice of the citizen. If the existence of the state is threatened, the lives of all its members are at its disposal and may be freely spent in war. The state, through taxation, may deprive the individual of his property, to be used as it may see fit. Whatever cannot be done efficiently or economically by private individuals or associations, or whatever affects the public welfare, may be regulated or managed by the state. Tariffs or subsidies may build up one interest or section and destroy another. Evidently the purpose aimed at in this process is the establishment of a number of well-organized, powerful states, each determining the relation of sovereignty to liberty in its own organization from the standpoint of both individual and state needs, and each determining its relation to other states from the standpoint chiefly of its own safety and aggrandizement.

However, this process leads to a third, and what may be considered the final, purpose of the state—a process just beginning. The relations arising among states, at first largely hostile in nature, lead in time to mutual understandings and interests. An international public opinion develops, commercial relations and means of communication and intercourse bind the whole civilized world into a unity. Inter-marriage and migration break down ethnic differences. Improved means of transportation diminish the influence of natural barriers, religious toleration arises and imitation creates a civilization fairly uniform over a large part of the earth. Under these conditions the interests of the world as a whole loom large and receive consideration, even when they conflict with the interests of its component political units. Altruism, in addition to egoism, becomes a national as well as an individual virtue.<sup>24</sup> This attitude is as yet only imperfectly realized, but many indications point to its further extension. International understanding and sympathy, international agreements, conferences, and organizations, and the expansion of international law and adjudication illustrate this tendency. The formation of colonial empires, composed of divergent and scattered parts, is breaking down the geographic and ethnic unity upon which the modern national states are based. The efforts of states to educate and civilize inferior peoples and to aid worthy projects, wherever found, show a feeling of responsibility and duty regardless of political boundaries; and some things, for example, science, literature and art, are little affected by the separation of mankind into separate governmental units.

<sup>24</sup> McKeechie, *The State and the Individual*, ch. xi.

The final aim of the state would thus be the furthering of the civilization and progress of the world.<sup>25</sup> In this process, it might, of course, sacrifice its own existence; it would certainly lose much of its external independence. Just as the perfection of national life demands the subordination of the individual, so the perfection of international life demands the subordination of the state. Modern states have not yet reached the point where they are willing to sacrifice their national independence and identity, and considerable difference of opinion exists as to the relative advantages and disadvantages that would result if it were accomplished. Just as the relation of state to individual gave rise to numerous difficulties, now fairly well adjusted, yet by no means finally or unanimously settled; so the relation of state to state creates problems whose solution is far from being in sight. The relative value of individual, state, and civilization in general, and the proper adjustments of each to secure the best net results—these are the questions upon whose answer depends the proper statement as to the end and purpose of the state. The end to which a state, at any given time, should chiefly direct its efforts depends, of course, upon the point that has been reached in its development. No state is in a position to extend its national influence and authority until it has set its own house in order and arranged satisfactorily its own organization and its relation to its component individuals. Neither can a state further the progress of civilization beyond its own boundaries until it has developed its peculiar national genius. These aims show a historical order as well as a development of philosophical conception; and the existence, side by side, of states with various points of view as to their main purpose, due to the stage of their political development, further complicates the already great difficulties in the way of a general consensus of political purpose.<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, these ends are closely interrelated and very delicately balanced. Each succeeding end is based upon the one that preceded it, which, when accomplished, becomes the means by which the following end is secured. That is, the establishment of authority and liberty serves as the basis for the development of political unity and solidarity, and this in turn lays the foundation for the progress of civilization in general. At the same time, each succeeding purpose lays a strain on the preceding stage which weakens or threatens to destroy it. No state can turn its attention to foreign affairs and play an important part in world politics without withdrawing attention from internal affairs, with resultant

<sup>25</sup> Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, pp. 316-318.

<sup>26</sup> Pollock, *History of the Science of Politics*, ch. iv.

dangers of political corruption or unsolved domestic problems. No state can shoulder the burden of elevating an inferior people without placing this burden upon its own citizens.<sup>27</sup> No state can promote the cause of civilization without diminishing the intensity of its own patriotism and national spirit. Hence, consideration must be given, not only to the proper means of attaining each of these ends, considered separately but also to the proper shifting of emphasis from one to the other, each of which is valuable and necessary, and to the modifications that must be made in each so that the others may, at the right time, be brought into evidence. The purpose of the modern state, accordingly, includes a more or less composite aim at securing order and justice for its citizens, providing for its own continued and developing existence, and promoting the progress of the world at large. The proper adjustment among these and the proper means of securing each of them opens up many important questions.

The modern theory of the state, then, consists of a historical survey of its origin and growth, of a critical and legal analysis of its nature, elements, organization, and relations, and of a philosophical and ethical conception of its ends and functions.<sup>28</sup> For this study material is drawn from historical data, from past political theory, and from present political conditions and ideals. Modern theory is further influenced by the prevailing mode of thought and the accepted ethical standards. While dealing with the concrete manifestations of various and diverse forms of political organization, the principles that underlie the state in the abstract, the universal phenomena of political life, are being discovered, analyzed, and classified. From all this material may be built up a theory of the state, viewing it as an organized whole, as the natural outgrowth of conditions in nature and among men, and as performing many and valuable services for the individual and for humanity.

<sup>27</sup> Reinsch, *World Politics*, pp. 347-356.

<sup>28</sup> Dunning, "Current Political Theory," in *Political Science Quarterly*. Dec. 1907.